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A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is
turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from
Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such a violence that the
angel can no longer close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into
the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before
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Walter Benjamin’s enigmatic reflection on Paul Klee’s painting
‘Angelus Novus’ urges us to question the idea of a progressive
teleological view of history, and it may help us to contemplate the
legacy of a colonial past, the challenges of decolonisation, and the
possibility of a postcolonial future. What approach are we to take to
colonial history, to its events and catastrophes? This is a pressing
question, especially when brought to bear on sovereign events and
catastrophes. The problem of colonial sovereignty might be observed
from the vantage point of Walter Benjamin’s angel of history. Should
we perceive an imperial usurpation, its establishment of a racist
colonial state and transition to a postcolony as a chain of events or
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Mbembe On the postcolony (2001) ch 2.
2
I use the term ‘archive’ after Jacques Derrida’s elaboration of it in Archive fever:
A Freudian impression (1995). Derrida emphasises how the archive resists
conceptualisation. Arkhç at once connotes a commencement and a command. As the
place where things commence it is a ‘physical, historical, or ontological principle’,
and it is the place from where social order, law, and authority might be given. The
archive, Derrida explains, is then potentially both an ontological and nomological
principle, id 1. The archive is the privileged intersection of place and law – the
topological and nomological, id 3. But the archive is a much more fraught concept,
linked to the finitude of being, the limits of memory, and is not so much about the
past as about the future. Derrida emphasises that the archive is more of an
‘impression’ than a concept – it is in-finite, indefinite, at once closing down and
opening to an outside, id 29. For further elaboration of Derrida’s use of archive in
relation to South Africa, see Cornell and van Marle ‘Exploring ubuntu: Tentative
reflections’ (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 195-220.
as a single catastrophe piling wreckage upon wreckage? The
difference might be that the former suggests an inexorable process
of violence and counter-violence, imperial excess and anti-colonial
struggle, the re-ordering of imperium and the establishment of new
tyrannies in the form of ‘private indirect government’;
1
 while the
latter imagines a singular sovereign event that needs to be reversed
if the ongoing disaster is to be arrested. Benjamin’s condensed
observation on history might then be extended to the colonial context
to suggest that it is futile to believe that there can be recoveries
from the excesses, misappropriations, violence, and domination of
the various kinds of colonial catastrophe. It also suggests that we
should not abandon ourselves blindly to what might be seen as the
progressive or contingent forces of history, even though the forces
that push us to this are very strong. The angel of history needs to
realise that awaking the dead or making whole what has been
smashed is an impossible enterprise. Nor should we fly blindly into
the future. Meditating on Benjamin’s ninth thesis is thus an apt way
to begin a discussion on what it means to deal with the bloody and
disastrous archive of colonial sovereignty – an archive that continues
to grow skyward while our capacity to attend to colonialism as a
single catastrophe becomes more and more remote.
2
Colonialism is certainly not reducible to a single catastrophe. Its
economic after-effects and political consequences continue to be
experienced in multiple ways by the people who live in postcolonial
nation states and in the erstwhile metro-poles. In white settler
colonies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States, recognition of the anti-colonial claims of the colonised
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See Watson ‘Illusionists and hunters: Being Aboriginal in this occupied space’ (2005)
22 Australian Feminist Law Journal 15; and Motha ‘Reconciliation as domination’ in
Veitch (ed) Law and the politics of reconciliation (2006) 69-91.
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Motha ‘The sovereign event in a nation’s law’ (2002) 13 Law and Critique 311-338;
and Motha ‘The failure of postcolonial sovereignty in Australia’ (2005) 22 Australian
Feminist Law Journal 107-125.
population takes place through one or other form of indigenous or
minority right such as unique forms of land rights, treaty rights, or
‘domestic dependent nation’ status. These are notoriously limited
forms of recognition, and new forms of colonial domination and
dispossession continue to emerge within their rubric.
3
 In nation states
where the conquered population has ostensibly recovered their
political independence, such as in India, South Africa, or Sri Lanka,
the legitimacy of postcolonial institutions, the borders of the nation
state, the treatment of minority populations, and the terms and
conditions of transition continue to be contested. If the wreckage of
disputed sovereignties is piling up – and from Jerusalem to Jaffna,
from Kashmir to the ‘Kingdom of the Zulus’, my sense is that it is –
then we need to ask whether indigenous sovereignty can continue to
be a concept through which an anti-colonial or postcolonial enterprise
can be progressed. This raises very difficult questions, and I can only
begin to identify and discuss some of their implications in this essay.
I have previously argued, in several essays, that the recognition of
indigenous law as law is a condition of any genuine approach to
postcolonial justice.
4
 I do not depart from that claim. This
immediately raises the very difficult question of the relationship
between sovereignty and normativity. The move to distinguish
sovereignty from normativity in a plural society is complex and
fraught. At the heart of postcolonial emancipation is the question of
which normative and epistemic system will determine the contours
of freedom and emancipation. Setting aside the fruitless relativisation
of values, ethics, and their epistemes, there remains the issue of
what theories of being and knowledge (onto-epistemes) will inform
a plural legal and social order. In this essay I explore these issues in
the ‘new’ South Africa. 
Sovereignty enters this fray as that which is at stake in self-
determination. It is this privileging of sovereignty that I seek to call
into question. The claim for indigenous sovereignty as a feature of
decolonisation cannot simply be set aside. Sovereignty persists as the
archive of colonialism – it is the archç, foundation, ground,
authorisation of what is ‘now’. It is also the constitutive force of the
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See Motha (n 4) (2005) ibid.
‘new’ (as postcolonial ‘people’ or democracy), and it is repeatedly
claimed to be the phenomenon to be recovered and preserved where
an anti-colonial being remains critical of postcolonial compromises.
This confluence of sovereignty, normativity, epistemology, and a
postcolonial political community is precisely what remains in
contention in the ‘new’ South Africa.
There can be no doubt that indigenous populations are among the
most disadvantaged on this planet. Addressing this condition would of
course require that attention be given to the claims of populations and
peoples that identify their (sovereign) demands as specific to a discreet
group. A crucial question is whether the reassertion of indigenous so-
vereignty can be an antidote to colonial sovereignty and its social and
economic concomitants. From the outset, then, I would seek to disting-
uish between indigenous sovereignty on the one hand, and indigenous
normative and epistemic systems on the other. This does not mean that
I think sovereignty and normativity can be utterly disassociated. Perhaps
sovereignty can always only be left in contention while means are found
to attend to its prevailing disasters. The fact that indigenous assertions
of sovereignty can productively disturb colonial and postcolonial
sovereignty is one reason why sovereignty remains a central plank of self-
determination. What is not clear is whether the re-assertion of indige-
nous sovereignty – though it is the expression of an anti-colonial stance,
and the naming of a historical wound – can avoid all of the disasters that
have been performed in the name of various manifestations of sovereign-
ty. It might be said that postcolonial peoples are entitled to their very
own disasters – the condition, perhaps, of any free and independent
consciousness. There is no shortage of opportunities to inhabit myth or
nihilism. My objective is to chart a course between the two.
The problem of sovereignty is particularly acute in a postcolonial
setting because the violence of colonial conquest is irremediable. The
postcolony, however hard it may try, sees the persistence of an in-
finite colonial sovereign imposition – that is, colonial sovereignty is
rendered finite by adjusting, archiving, transforming the social and
juridical order through a national liberation struggle, but to the
extent that colonial juridical, economic, and social orders persist, the
colonial usurpation has an infinite reach.
5
 This in-finite character of
postcolonial sovereignty can be observed in South Africa. The ‘new’
South Africa is by now famous the world over for a transformation
from apartheid, a racist juridical and social system, put in place
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Ramose ‘In memoriam: Sovereignty and the ‘new’ South Africa’ (2007) Griffith Law
Review 310.
7
Other than when it appears in italicised form in a quotation, I have not italicised the
word ‘ubuntu’ in this essay. The SA Publiekreg/Public Law style guide states that
‘[f]oreign words and expressions are italicised, for example Grundnorm, a quo and
bona fide’. ‘Foreign’ is hardly a precise or instructive category. I am assuming that
‘ubuntu’ is not ‘foreign’ in South Africa and thus should not, on the stated criteria
of this journal, be italicised.
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Van der Walt Law and sacrifice (2005).
precisely at the moment when anti-colonial struggles were ripening
and erstwhile imperial powers began to be forced out of direct
colonial rule. Apartheid South Africa resisted anti-colonialism and
consequent models of self-determination for over 50 years. But has
the post-apartheid juridical order inaugurated a postcolony – that is,
has South Africa been decolonised? In the South African setting there
appears to be a double liberation at stake – from apartheid on the
one hand, and from the cultural, social, and economic consequences
of a longer colonial domination on the other. Epistemology and
normativity, as I will show below, appear to be part of what remains
at stake in ongoing anti-colonial struggles in South Africa. That
economic dis-empowerment is neglected in many of the philosophical
positions addressed below about normativity, epistemology, and
sovereignty only compounds their shortcomings. 
Magobe Ramose, for instance, has argued that decolonisation in
South Africa has dulled the urge for the recovery of a ‘lost
sovereignty’.
6
 He calls for a renewal of the struggle to recover the
lost sovereignty of the ‘indigenous conquered peoples of South
Africa’. What are the implications of making sovereignty (and the re-
ordering of the political around sovereignty) the vehicle through
which the injustices of colonial conquest are addressed? What are the
implications of making an authentic and originary sovereignty the
condition of decolonisation? Can the notions of indigeneity and
plurality be reconciled in a postcolonial setting? Ramose makes the
call to reconsider the post-apartheid compromise on the basis of
ubuntu as the central epistemology and ontology of the Bantu
speaking peoples of Southern Africa.
7
 I will elaborate the contours of
his arguments below. Here, by way of introduction, I will briefly
explain why I juxtapose Ramose’s observation that the transformation
in post-apartheid South Africa is prolonging a colonial usurpation,






Id 8, 10. 
Both Ramose and Van der Walt are addressing what is at stake in
‘putting things right’ in a fractured polity. To that extent both are
concerned with a ‘re-treatment’ of the political community after
what Van der Walt has described as the ‘retreat’ of the political
during apartheid.
9
 Ramose raises the stakes. For him apartheid was
one aspect of a longer and deeper colonial imposition, and arriving
at a compromise between radically divided communities after
apartheid has not dealt with the originary violence of the imperial
usurpation of sovereignty. In Benjamin’s terms, Van der Walt
perceives a ‘chain of events’, a contingent history, and Ramose sees
‘one single catastrophe’ that must be put right. Both writers also
perceive a role for the living dead in their philosophy – a politics of
reparation and restoration that makes their work comparable. For
Van der Walt the sacrifice of the dead (especially where it arises as
a consequence of juridical decisions) must be regarded as a
temporary setting aside of their position that may be restored at a
later point. This is the essence of his jurisprudence of sacrifice which
I elaborate below. For Ramose, the ‘living dead’ and their heroic
sacrifices make it incumbent on present generations to restore parity
between coloniser and colonised. This parity involves the recovery of
a lost sovereignty. My argument is that neither the recovery of a lost
sovereignty nor a logic of sacrifice should animate post-apartheid
jurisprudence. Plurality has become over-invested in re-treating the
political when a more complex tension between ways of being and
knowing, and unequal economic distributions are at stake. This essay
seeks to draw attention to these latter concerns. 
Before proceeding with a more detailed discussion of archiving
sovereignty through ubuntu, or a jurisprudence of sacrifice, two further
preliminary points need to be made. The first is to give some wider
theoretical contextualisation to the notion of the ‘political’. This is
necessary, as the attempt to deal with sovereignty, by both Van der Walt
and Ramose, takes place through the concept of the political.
Sovereignty is archived through a re-treatment of the political, though
Ramose is more explicit that his effort is to re-treat the event of colonial
sovereignty – to recover a lost sovereignty. The second is to highlight the
persistence in South Africa of what Ramose has termed epistemicide – or
what more widely can be regarded as the prevailing Eurocentrism in the
academy and among the South African intellectual elite. I then proceed
to discuss Ramose and Van der Walt in more detail.
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See generally Arendt The human condition (1958); Schmitt Political theology: Four
chapters on the concept of sovereignty (1985); Schmitt The concept of the political
(1996); Mouffe The democratic paradox (2000); Jean-Luc Nancy The inoperative
community (1991); Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy Retreating the political (1997). The text
by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy contains an account of how the ‘political’ came to be
such a central plank of discussion in contemporary French philosophy in the early 1980s.
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Foucault Society must be defended: Lectures at the Collége de France (2003); and
Butler The psychic life of power (1997).
12
Agamben Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life (1998) 6.
On the political 
‘Putting things right’ in a fractured polity and attending to the problem
of sovereignty in the postcolony have come to be regarded as a problem
of reordering and reorienting the political community. Conflict and
antagonism in post-apartheid, postcolonial, and post-war societies have
come to be seen as a problem of the political as such. The intellectual
currents that have informed this focus on the political include Hannah
Arendt’s concern to distinguish various modes of labour, work, and
political life; the left’s revival of Schmittian decisionism and the friend/
enemy distinction as a critique of liberalism and deliberative democracy;
and a largely post-structural preoccupation to imagine ‘community’
beyond communitarian essences after the totalitarian excesses of fascism
and communism which had instituted an essential ground for being-in-
common.
10
 The political became a key focus of the political theory of
democracy and sovereignty at a moment when the autonomous liberal
subject had been rendered illusory by multiple critiques from intellectual
and political currents such as feminism, postcolonialism, and critical race
studies, and when the revolutionary subject of ‘masses and classes’ went
the way of ‘world revolution’. Power also ceased to be treated as the
over-determining action of a centralised sovereign or the state. Foucault
explained how power was at once constituted and resisted within the
body of the subject.
11
 The subject came to be regarded as individuated
through biopolitical modes of power. The concept of the political
emerged in this context as the dimension in which a variety of sovereign
antagonisms would play out. Giorgio Agamben’s thought attempted to
bring together Foucault’s theorisation of subjection, Schmitt’s thought
on sovereignty and the political, and Arendt’s critiques of totalitarianism
and human rights. According to Agamben, Foucault’s attempts to de-
emphasise the questions ‘what legitimates power? and ‘what is the
state?’ removed the theoretical privileging of sovereignty but failed to
explain the point of intersection between ‘techniques of individuali-
zation’ and ‘totalizing procedures’.
12
 Agamben’s characterisation of the
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It is beyond the scope of this essay to take up this problem of universality. Some
of its contours have been explored and shaped by the following thinkers, though the
central questions require further research and elaboration: Butler Laclau and Žižek,
Contingency, hegemony, universality: Contemporary dialogues on the left (2000);
Badiou Saint Paul: The foundation of universalism (2003); Žižek The fragile absolute
or, why the CHRISTIAN legacy is worth fighting for? (2001); Žižek The puppet and the
dwarf: The perverse core of Christianity (2003).
14
Mbembe (n 1) ch 2.
15
See Nancy ‘Church, state, resistance’ in Motha (ed) Democracy’s empire (2007);
Fitzpatrick ‘Gods would be needed …’: American empire and the rule of
inclusive-exclusion of ‘abandoned being’ or ‘bare life’ from the political
and juridical order did much to complicate the relationship between
political-life (bios) and sovereignty. We were thus left with the concept
of the ‘political’ as the central site where the treatment of life by
power/law was contested, and where the antagonisms previously
represented through class-conflict or colonial domination would be
interrogated.
In this essay I question the usefulness of this preoccupation with
the ‘political’. I do not wish to overstate the pervasiveness of the
focus on the political, nor do I wish to suggest that this focus has
been unimportant, but attention to the political as an ontological
problem distinct from the ontic concerns of politics is rapidly giving
way to a resurgent demand to reinstitute a universal ground of
subjectivity and politics. The persistent problem of a universal
ground and its onto-theological properties is one problem that
demands attention.
13
 The other is the persistence of the tension
between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’. The respective autonomies of
state and civil society were always contestable, but are now made
more evident by the fact that public power is increasingly in private
hands, that many parts of the world grapple with what Achille
Mbembe has characterised with respect to African countries as
‘private indirect government’.
14
 This is not only a matter of economic
power being increasingly in the hands of private individuals and
corporations – that is hardly new. What is also evident is that the
source of authority is not only in the hands of the traditional liberal
constitutive power – the democratic constituency, or the ‘people’ –
but in various heteronomic formations such as religion, tradition, and
culture. The so called ‘return of religion’ is only a magnification of
what has always been present since the era of the nation state – that
the state could not give itself its own law by its own means (auto-
nomy), and that Gods were always needed (heteronomy).
15
 The
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(international) law’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 429-466. I have
begun to explore some of the tensions between autonomy and heteronomy in Motha,
‘Veiled women and the affect of religion in democracy’ (2007) 34/1 Journal of Law
and Society 139-62; and Motha ‘Liberal cults, suicide bombers, and other theological
dilemmas’ (2009) 5/2 Journal of Law Culture and Humanities 228-46. 
concept of the political cannot carry the weight of these multiple
intersecting contestations of private as public power, of heteronomic
formations as public authority, and of anti-colonial challenges to the
legitimacy of present sovereign formations. In the discussion that
follows I hope to establish that the re-treatment of the political
cannot contend with these challenges. 
A note on eurocentrism
I was glad to hear that you were critical. For a moment I thought
you were going to tell us that ubuntu is the answer.’ 
This was a statement made to me by one of the participants at a
conference titled ‘States of Statelessness’ at the University of South
Africa where I presented parts of this essay in August, 2009. This is
not an uncommon reaction when I mention ubuntu in South Africa.
Otherwise progressive intellectuals, judges, and academics have
looked politely at me, smiled, and treated my interest in ubuntu as
the quaint fascination of an outsider. It has been remarked to me that
ubuntu is ‘a dangerous communitarian notion’, that ‘no one really
knows what it means’, that there is no ‘rigorous archive from which
an authoritative account can be drawn’, or that ‘it is a backward
tradition not apt for modern times’. One of the more witty remarks
was the following: ‘Ubuntu – sounds like a good idea!’ – ironically
alluding to Mahatma Gandhi’s famed remark when asked by a
reporter what he thought of ‘western civilisation’ – ‘I think it would
be a very good idea’, he quipped. I have not attributed these remarks
as they express what I believe is a common sentiment among many
South Africans, and they were sometimes said in private
conversations. Besides, they only serve as a general backdrop to a
more acute institutional erasure of ubuntu in the ‘new’ South Africa.
No one has yet been able to give a comprehensive account, and I
have asked some prominent constitutional lawyers, of why ubuntu
seemed to have such a prominent role in the interim Republic of
South Africa Constitution 1993 and in the early decisions of the
Constitutional Court (discussed below), and then nearly disappeared
(save one mention in a Schedule) in the Constitution of the Republic
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Some people blame the North American ‘plain language’ drafters – but this is a curious
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See Connolly Pluralism (2005).
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For a useful discussion of the problems with the ‘line drawing’ I am referring to
here, see Edkins ‘Whatever politics’ in Calarco and DeCaroli (eds) Giorgio Agamben:
Sovereignty and life (2007) 70-91.
of South Africa 1996.
16
 Is the presence of the notion of ubuntu in the
Interim Constitution merely an indigenous flourish that got people
through hard times? Was ubuntu’s momentary appearance in the
interim Constitution the excessive mark of an excessive demand for
peace, forgiveness, and community? We will see below what a central
role ubuntu played in the case of AZAPO v The President which
articulated its significance for inspiring a relatively peaceful
transition from apartheid to a post-apartheid legal order and state.
Whether ubuntu will be accorded the status of epistemology,
ontology, or philosophy is precisely what is at stake in whether South
Africa and the minds of its intellectuals, judges, and academics can
be decolonised.
Decolonising legal theory is one of the major challenges faced by
the South African legal academy. Needless to say this cannot be
accomplished by the laudable efforts at changing the colour and
gender of personnel in law schools alone. It is certainly my
experience that the mention of ubuntu attracts the suspicion that one
is a reactionary communalist or a romantic nativist. I am neither
communalist nor nativist, and as the reader will see below, I think
much that is regressive, as with almost any philosophy, can be
proposed in the name of ubuntu. But the task is to deal with that
head on with an ethos of engagement that is central to the possibility
of a truly plural polity.
17
 What tends to be holding sway at present –
and I discuss this at length with reference to Van der Walt’s Law and
sacrifice – is a confidence that the ‘Christian, Kantian, and Millsian’
respect for the individual is vastly superior to the ‘indigenous
communitarian’ one. The root of this error, at least in the literature
I deal with here, is twofold. The first is the failure to explicitly
examine how asserting different ‘forms of life’ (human, animal, bare
life, etc) are normatively and epistemologically contingent. Human,
animal, or bare life, are tropes for different forms and gradations of
political subjection. But if these tropes are deployed without being
attentive to how this ‘line drawing’ (between human/animal,
political/bare life) re-inscribes a sovereign operation, then the trope
risks reinforcing and completing the sovereign exclusions.
18
 Thinking
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For a useful discussion of such claims, see Comaroff and Comaroff ‘Law and
disorder in the postcolony’ (2007) 15 Social Anthropology 133-152. 
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See Agamben Remnants of Auschwitz: The witness and the archive (2002).
other-wise in this setting must involve an attentiveness to what
exceeds political subjection as human, animal, and bare life. The
second problem, and this is linked to the first, is the co-emergence
of imperialism and modernity indexed to the European subject as the
one with access to a transparent knowledge of self, and Europe’s
others as affected beings fixed in primal stasis. Let me briefly
comment on each of these problems in turn.
I have heard it remarked that it is because black South Africans
exist in a condition of ‘bare life’ that crime is accompanied by such
extreme acts of violence and torture in present day South Africa.
Such a claim has much in common with characterisations of the
excessive disorderliness, and the kleptocratic and savage sovereign-
ties that seem to proliferate in accounts of the global South.
19
 Has the
country/continent literally and metaphorically ‘gone to the dogs’?
These claims go to the heart of the problem of archiving colonialism
I invoked at the outset. Is contemporary violence and disorderliness
merely contingent on the brutalisations of colonialism and apartheid?
Can such a question even be addressed in the register of tropes such
as human/animal, political/bare life? What such accounts of violence
and disorderliness seem to suggest is that once de-humanised by
colonialism and apartheid, black people have not regained the
humanity through which a crime can have an instrumental economic
motive, or a variety of motives. Bare life cannot commit a vengeful
crime and be called to account for it. Without the volition of human
agency, violence committed by bare life can only be the automatic
act of a being without subjective will. This extension of the figure of
bare life to perpetrators of violent crime is doubly curious as, at least
in Agamben’s renditions of the Muselmann, and other instances of
such abjectness, this is a being that is furthest from any substantive
will.
20
 There is of course no way to generally prove or disprove the
motivations of extreme violence. The liberal register of ‘motive’ and
‘responsibility’ hardly seems adequate to such large questions of
being, subjection, and politics. What the discourse which
characterises South Africans who commit extreme violence as ‘bare
life’ does disclose, however, is that they are in the worst Hegelian
fashion (Hegel described Africa as the continent without history)
being deprived of historical agency, the capacity to be subjects of
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Van der Walt Law and sacrifice 124. 
22
Agamben’s argument in Homo Sacer is that bare life can be killed but not sacrificed
– that is, bare life ceases to figure in either sacred or profane modes of valuing life.
Bare life is cast beyond sacred or profane mediation and instrumentality. Van der
Walt disputes the possibility of non-sacrificial killing later in ch 5. I am less
interested in whether Agamben’s arguments about sacrifice can be validly extended
to the South African setting. My concern is with the designation of the majority of
South Africans as bare life during apartheid – a designation I regard as spurious. And
if they are not bare life, then their political sacrificeability seems to follow without
further discussion being necessary. 
historical contingency, and the status of responsible agents of human
action even if it is of the worst kind. 
The emptying of the political capacities of the majority of South
Africans on the basis of their exclusion from the apartheid order is
explicitly asserted by Van der Walt in Law and sacrifice, albeit with
reference to the apartheid period:
they [the majority of South Africans] remained expelled even when they
continued physically to live in white South Africa. They had no civil rights
to speak of and no freedom of movement. There were strict rules as to
where they could go and when they could go there. And when they failed
to observe these rules, their last remnants of bios (political life) turned
into a matter of mere zoç (bare life or life as such). As the Sharpeville
massacre and many subsequent killings would make quite clear, they
could be killed for not observing the rules of apartheid without this killing
constituting a crime. Black people who lived in South Africa had the status
of Agamben’s homo sacer.
21
Can it really be said that black people were expelled from humanity,
rendered homo sacer, by the extreme violence and degradation imposed
by the apartheid regime?
22
 Black people during apartheid could be killed
with impunity, or ‘be killed without being sacrificed’ in Agamben’s
enigmatic formulation. Let us assume that Van der Walt intends that
having ‘the status of bare life’ in the eyes of the colonial or apartheid
state is distinct from actually being bare life or homo sacer. However,
the drawing of lines between political and bare life, between human and
animal, bios and zoç in the context of apartheid raises more questions
than it answers. Have the majority of South Africans recovered their
political life and agentive capacities? On what basis did this recovery
take place? Was it (humanity, citizenship?) merely given back to them?
Did the recovery of political life merely happen through the adoption of
new political institutions and constitutions? Was the abjectness of the
‘status of bare life’ simply about formal rights of political citizenship or
is much more at stake? If forms of life such as ‘bare life’ are to be
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deployed in the process of generating a post-apartheid theory of law,
then these questions need to be addressed. I want to suggest that
characterising black South Africans during apartheid as bare life is far
from helpful. It has the potential to deface the revolutionary struggles
many South Africans engaged in against apartheid. Apartheid was toppled
with the force of an eloquent, strategic, organised, and sometimes
violent will. This capacity to resist colonialism and apartheid goes to the
heart of whether Europe’s others are regarded as having the full capacity
of selfhood – of being conscious beings of action, thought, and invention
whatever the status accorded to them by their masters.
As Ferreira da Silva points out, the culture that is associated with
contingency (historical progress) and universality is posited as the one
that is presumed to have access to ‘transparency’ (internal self-
determination) – and, importantly, this is a transparency that is
distinguished spatially from Europe’s others (externality).
23
Contingency (historicity) and universality have survived the death of
the subject.
24
 Ferreira da Silva argues that the post-enlightenment,
European production of ‘Man’ is posited through an onto-
epistemology that is enabled by the racial subjection of Europe’s
others. The Cartesian ‘I’ is self-determining, but must account for the
difference that it confronts in a global, spatial terrain of power and
representation. The distinction is then wrought between internally
determined (regulated, and produced) beings, and the external
affected racial bodies. The internal/temporal versus external/spatial
opposition is then central to the global hierarchy of racial difference:
Hegel’s transcendental poesis, which consolidates self-consciousness
as an interior/temporal thing, the transparent ‘I’, the one that always
already knows that it houses that which is not itself, also renders the
nineteenth century deployment of the racial both possible and
necessary. Without that other moment in which ‘being’ is always less
than, farther from, an ‘other being’, that is, exteriority/spatiality,
the ontological priority of the interior/temporal thing would be
meaningless ... .
25
This colonial ordering of being is at the heart of characterising the
majority of South Africans as bare life, but this is done at the expense
of the African as a resistant being with political will. Johan van der
Walt’s account of the crime of apartheid deprives its victims of the
(2009) 24 SAPR/PL310
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capacities and potentials through which they might find lines of flight
from the ongoing formations of human degradation. If legal theory is
to have anything to say about politics or the political, then it must be
attentive to these lines of flight.
Conceiving of the challenge of plurality as a problem of the
political without addressing the Eurocentric episteme of post-
apartheid jurisprudence is a serious shortcoming of Van der Walt’s
Law and sacrifice. Turning this around is not just a matter of
translating certain concepts from an indigenous idiom to a more
familiar European one. ubuntu, for example, has been transposed as
dignity in a Kantian idiom.
26
 The challenge is to establish a truly
multiplicitous philosophical and juridical idiom beyond what can be
‘tolerated’ within the limits of translatability.
Remembering sovereignty
Conscious perhaps of the theological roots of sovereignty, and with
an explicit reference to the sentiments of mourning, Magobe Ramose
begins his essay ‘In memoriam: Sovereignty in the “new” South
Africa’ with a prayer.
27
 For Ramose, speaking of sovereignty in the
new South Africa is a requiem mass – a gesture that marks a death,
while asserting the need to resurrect a sovereignty that has been
buried, displaced, and mis-recognised. There is a firm refusal here to
allow the ‘lost sovereignty’ of all peoples conquered in the ‘unjust
wars of colonialism’ to remain a memory. Recovery and restoration
are claimed as the twin exigencies of justice and as the ‘necessary
means to the construction of peace in South Africa’.
28
 Despite
asserting the oneness of the ‘human race’, Ramose‘s concern is to
revisit the bounded reasoning, the racial logics, the epistemicide,
that saw the erection of differences and distinctions between
civilisations and cultures during the period of colonial conquest. The
process of de-colonisation, in Ramose’s view, is not yet concluded,
and certainly was not achieved through the elimination of Apartheid
and the guarantee of civil rights since April 1994.
29
 While those who
pushed a compromise in the early 1990s argued that they were











averting a civil war, Ramose’s claim is that since colonisation South
Africa has been ‘practically in a state of war’.
30
 In his view it was
gullible and misleading to think that apartheid was the fundamental
problem. This is why freedom was reduced to the guarantee of
fundamental rights.
31
 The morality and political legitimacy of the
colonial ‘right of conquest’ was left untouched. Ramose thus
challenges the reasoning that asserted, from the Freedom Charter
onwards, that ‘South Africa belonged to all who lived in it’. 
The question of indigeneity is placed front and centre in this
discourse on the problem of decolonising South Africa. On this basis
the ‘Coloured’ and Indian communities in South Africa are ‘for
reasons of history ... distinguished from the indigenous conquered
peoples of South Africa’.
32
 The ‘Coloured’, we are told, need not
make a choice between their ‘relatives’ or a new identity. They are
human beings and that humanity should drive them to seek ‘justice’
for the unjust wars of colonialism. The Indian on the other hand
‘cannot have the same historical consciousness on the loss of
sovereign title to territory as the indigenous peoples conquered in the
unjust wars of colonisation’.
33
 Despite these differences and
distinctions the ‘Coloured’ and the Indian can share in the same
historical consciousness as the indigenous peoples. According to
Ramose, this has generally not been the case, and it is because of this
lack of historical consciousness about the loss of sovereignty, that the
constitutional recognition of the civil rights of everyone has been
more attractive.
34
A post-conquest South Africa, Ramose argues, must attend to the
failure to recognise that the sovereignty of indigenous communities
has been deprived through an illegitimate war and usurpation.
Abiding by community in African culture requires that the three
dimensions of the living, the living dead, and the yet to be born are
taken to be the critical ethical concern. Thus the survival of
customary kingship, and the memory of the heroes and heroines who
fought against colonialism requires that parity – horizontality – be
restored between the ‘indigenous conquered peoples and that of the







Ramose ‘The king as memory and symbol of African customary law’ in  Hinz and
Pateman (eds) The shades of new leaves: Governance in traditional authority, a
Southern African perspective (2006) 351-74 at 366.
38
Ibid. To that extent the claim that sovereignty must be recovered might be seen
as a strategic claim to secure onto-epistemic parity for the law of the colonised
peoples. But this is ambiguous in Ramose’s writings. 
‘reaffirmation’ of such ‘horizontal reasoning’ is a necessary condition
for a genuinely autochthonous constitution.
35
 The examples Ramose
draws on to make this point are the primacy of ‘KwaZulu’ in KwaZulu-
Natal, the existence of a Zulu King, and the parity that is demanded
for African customary law in relation to the ‘law of the land’. He
concludes by arguing that: 
Hierocratic reasoning should not be permitted to prevail unless it
recognises horizontality as the basis and reason for its existence, and
thus as its indispensable complement. ‘African customary law’ is living
testimony to the prevailing conflict of values between the successors
in title to the unjust wars of colonisation and the indigenous peoples
conquered in those wars.
36
The demand for the restoration of ‘equilibrium’ and for ‘authentic
liberation’ can be concretised, though space will not permit me to
explore all of its implications here. Highlighting two significant issues
must suffice for now: the subordinate status accorded to Indigenous,
Bantu, or customary law in the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, and the racial ideology that converted parliamentary
supremacy to constitutional supremacy in the transition to a post-
apartheid legal order. For Ramose:
Ubuntu … represents the epistemological paradigm that informs the
cultural practices, including the law, of the Bantu-speaking peoples.
Excluding it from the constitution is tantamount to denying the Bantu-
speaking peoples a place in the constitutional dispensation of the
country. The current Constitution is, therefore not the mirror of the
legal ideas and institutions of the indigenous conquered peoples of
South Africa. It follows then that a truly South African Constitution is
yet to be born. On this reasoning, Act 108 of 1996 [the Constitution],
has, perhaps inadvertently, set the stage for the struggle for a new
constitutional order in South Africa. 
37
What is sought is not the retrieval of an ‘authentic’ past but
‘parity’ between the various conceptions of law of the conquered and
the conqueror.
38
 Moreover, Ramose stresses that there is no reason
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to suppose that the objection of ‘traditionalism’ in relation to African
law can be made from anything but a position of ignorance. As he
points out, it is only arrogance and ignorance that form the basis for
suggesting that ‘traditional leadership in Africa is equal to static and
dogmatic resistance to change and adaptation’.
39
 Drawing on tradition
and modernity for fashioning values and laws fitting for contemporary
times must at least begin from the parity of legal ideas and
institutions between conquered and conqueror. It is precisely this
parity that has been denied by the Constitution and its high priests.
Examining the move to constitutional supremacy ushered in by the
new Constitution of 1996, Ramose asks why the turn to ‘colour-blind’
majority rule engendered fear of a black constituency. The reason
behind the conversion from parliamentary to constitutional supremacy,
despite the principle of anti-racism in the constitution, is ‘racialist
thinking’: ‘The fact that the conqueror considered the black majority as
a race, coming into the constitutional process, was itself racialist
thinking’.
40
 There was a fear that the putative ‘black race’ would have
unanimity on all matters and thus threaten all ‘other’ interests if they
were granted legislative or Parliamentary supremacy. Rather than
signalling the return of sovereignty to the colonised population, the
terms of the transition from apartheid to post-apartheid is viewed by
Ramose as yet another inscription of a colonial racial logic. Parliamentary
sovereignty – and the consequent threat of majoritarianism – was dealt
with by the introduction of constitutional supremacy. Equality and civil
rights would be guaranteed by the constitution – as would the ill-gotten
gains of several centuries of colonial violence and usurpation. This might
be seen as a pragmatic political sacrifice. What is particularly
disappointing, now, is that the onto-episteme that enabled that
compromised is threatened with erasure.
The case that epitomises the post-apartheid order of sacrifice is
Azapo v The President.
41
 This case is also a productive place from
which to begin a consideration of how the dismissal of ubuntu
symbolises the emergence of a jurisprudence of sacrifice in the ‘new’
South Africa. Sacrifice was a key feature of democratic transition.
Consider the Constitutional Court’s answer to the question of why the
state should not be responsible for the actions of its agents when




responsibility from delictual claims for the actions of its agents as the
applicants claimed? The answer lies in the emergence of an order of
sacrifice. The state can either compensate the victims of killings,
torture and other violations of human rights or state funds can be
directed towards the social and economic well-being of the living,
and of future generations. According to the Constitutional Court in
Azapo, the negotiators who brought into being the Constitution: 
could have chosen to saddle the state with liability for claims made
by insurance companies which had compensated institutions for
delictual acts performed by the servants of the state and to that
extent again divert funds otherwise desperately needed to provide
food for the hungry, roofs for the homeless and black boards and
desks for those struggling to obtain admission to desperately
overcrowded schools. They were entitled to permit the claims of such
school children and the poor and the homeless to be preferred.
42
The new democratic order, according to the Epilogue to the interim
Constitution, would be a ‘reconciliation between the people of South
Africa and the reconstruction of society’. It is worth paying attention to
this account of reconciliation. This is not a reconciliation between
previously conflicted polities, colonisor and colonised, or between the
beneficiaries of apartheid and the disenfranchised of that system. It is
not reconciliation of a fractured society coming together to form a
unified whole (again). It is not a restoration of a lost sovereignty. To the
extent that sovereignty is archived at the instance of transition from
apartheid to post-apartheid, it is the re-membering, the re-constituting
of a polity that did not exist. It is precisely a sacrificial reconciliation –
a case of becoming reconciled to what will be forgone when amnesty is
granted for political crimes, when property rights are guaranteed despite
the unjust conditions of accumulation, when redistribution will be
balanced with social and economic stability. And so reconciliation must
be understood through its verb – to become reconciled to a particular
liberal constitutional project. It is not a reconciliation of the law of the
conqueror and conquered, or of their respective and multiple
philosophical traditions. Indeed, the status of ubuntu philosophy is such
that it might even be said, as Ramose has argued, that the ‘struggle for
reason’ in Africa remains. If reconciliation is to be the restoration of
sociality, then we must still ask, what is being restored? What is this
sociality? For now, let us turn to look more closely at the emergence of
a logic of sacrifice as a post-apartheid theory of law.
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Indeed, ‘victims’ were later granted a once-off payment of ‘reparations’ that
would in most cases be less than their delictual claim. 
44







From ubuntu to the sacrificial order of post-
apartheid South Africa
The Constitutional Court in Azapo refused to hold the state delictually
liable for the actions of its servants if they had been granted amnesty.
The logic for holding the state liable would have been that – despite the
instrumental reason for granting amnesty to individuals who disclosed the
truth of a particular act, omission or offence – the state that benefited
from his endeavour is an entity that can nonetheless pay compensation
to the victim. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that such an option
was available, but saw that the negotiators of post-apartheid transition
did not wish the ‘new’ state to be incapable of providing for the needs
of the poor or the homeless.
43
 One claim to justice was sacrificed in the
name of not forgoing what was claimed to be its ‘opportunity cost’. Law
as sacrifice does not amount to very much more than that. Providing a
particular denial is acknowledged, then its setting aside, its status as a
‘dismissed aspiration’, is not a ‘dismissal’ but a ‘being-set-beside’ for the
time being. This is how Johan van der Walt more generally characterises
post-apartheid law.
44
 For Van der Walt, ‘adjudication as such is
sacrificial’
45
 – and so the logic of sacrifice must also extend to the Azapo
case on ‘amnesty’. However, his account is specifically developed with
reference to the horizontal application of fundamental rights in the South
African Constitution.
Van der Walt’s account of the logic of sacrifice arises out of a
conception of community or the ‘political’ as a plurality that is never
subsumed in any form of commonality. There is, however, the curious
imposition of the enforced commonality of the law of sacrifice. For
Van der Walt, legal and political decisions involve a conflict of
privatised interests which are re-presentations of multiple
possibilities and potentialities. This sense of plurality, then, is
understood ‘strictly in terms of difference and otherness’.
46
 A
decision in a ‘serious case’ where opinions, convictions and political
possibilities are in fundamental conflict occasion a ‘retreat of
plurality’.
47
 Indeed pluralit, or the political, retreats from such a


















destruction of plurality, or the retreat of the political. It is also, I
want to insist, the enforcement of another commonality. The task as
Van der Walt sees it is to ‘retrieve the retreat’ of the political.
48
 In
terms of this logic, Van der Walt names apartheid as an instance of
the withdrawal of plurality which took place without any regard for
the retreat of the political. Post-apartheid law and legal theory is
then named as its opposite, as a ‘constant regard for and
acknowledgement of the sacrificial destruction of the otherness that
conditions plurality’.
49
 Sacrifice is thus inevitable according to this
logic. The difference between apartheid and post-apartheid law is
that the sacrifice is acknowledged in the latter.
Van der Walt’s treatment of reconciliation takes its bearings from
a Kantian conception of law and freedom. Here reconciliation is the
impossibility of the liberty of one individual’s freedom being
reconciled with that of another under a general law of liberty.
50
 An
antinomy of freedom is derived from this – one where the possibility
of freedom is always conditioned by an ‘imminent threat’ of its
destruction.
51
 The logic is a familiar Derridian one – the enduring
antinomy of the ‘possibility that derives from the impossibility’.
52
 And
so, only the unforgivable can be forgiven, hospitality exposes the host
to the conditions that destroy hospitality, and justice is an exposure
to the undecidable: ‘one does nothing if one does not do the
impossible’.
53
 Reconciliation is then the constant possibility and
impossibility, the hiding and exposure, closure and disclosure of a
political reality. 
Van der Walt uses the metaphor of the ‘flipping coin’ which must
be airborne for as long and as often as is possible.
54
 For Van der Walt
the legal decision and social development is ‘a matter of chance’.
Hence the metaphor of ‘flipping a coin’:
once we accept that there is nothing normatively necessary in the
evolution of societies, that social development is a matter of chance or
sheer historicity, the legal decision, however normatively founded in a
particular social context, inevitably becomes a matter of chance.
55




Chaskalson P para 131; Langa J para 223 (acknowledging that the Constitution does
not define ubuntu); Madala J at para 237 (the concept carries the notion of
humaneness, social justice and fairness – and contra Langa J, the concept is
supposed to be ‘well enunciated in the Constitution’, para 243-44; ‘and ubuntu …
calls for a balancing of the interest of society against those of the individual, for the
maintenance of law and order, but not for dehumanising and degrading the
individual’, para 250), Mohamed J para 263 as quoted above; Mokgoro J para 307-8:
This is a logic, when brought to bear through a theory of law as
sacrifice, that ultimately has nothing normative to say about the death
of the other. At the heart of this conception of the legal decision, of
apartheid/post-apartheid, indeed of the contingency of human relations,
is a lack of historical understanding of colonialism and its social
organisation. Overall, post-apartheid ‘law as sacrifice’ is an exemplary
instance of the political limits of ‘re-treating the political’. The
enterprise of re-treating the political manifests the exhaustion of
emancipatory potential in the concept of the political itself. 
As I suggested at the outset in my comments on the political, the
post-communist tendency to direct emancipatory struggles through
the reconstruction of the polity, the growth of a politics of
recognition, and the favour accorded to the ontological over the
ontic, have led to a point where the political is granted a primacy
over normativity. This practically Hobbesian absorption of the subject
within sovereign calculations, the subordination of the part to the
whole, has ironically resulted in a theory of law that has relinquished
normativity. Thankfully, the legal and social order need not be left
to this norm-less sacrificial order, or bare contingency. The problem
of normativity must also confront the issue of epistemicide that I
highlighted earlier. To examine that, let us consider the treatment of
ubuntu in the post-apartheid theory of law and sacrifice. 
Van der Walt discusses ubuntu in the context of considering the
Counstitutional Court’s decision in The State v Makwanyane.
56
 I shall not
rehearse in detail the multiple ways by which the judges in that case
determined that the death penalty was contrary to the Constitution.
Suffice it to say that the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit capital
punishment. The judges therefore drew on, inter alia, the provisions
which guarantee the respect for life and dignity, sections 9 and 10
respectively, and the prohibition of ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment’ (s 11). A number of judges also drew heavily on the
concept of ubuntu as it was set out in the Epilogue to the interim
Constitution and in other sources.
57
 Admittedly, none of the judges give
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‘Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it
translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu
ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so
central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group
solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective
unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. Its spirit emphasises
respect for human dignity, marking a shift from confrontation to conciliation. In South
Africa ubuntu has become a notion with particular resonance in the building of a
democracy’; Sachs J para 374 (the latter will be discussed in what follows). 
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the concept of ubuntu a particularly comprehensive treatment. But what
would it mean to be sufficiently comprehensive, especially in the deploy-
ment of a value, such as ubuntu, or humanity, reasonableness,
forgiveness, conscionabilty or any one of a myriad of animating or tran-
scendent principles of the law? Ubuntu was invoked by the Constitutional
Court as one of the sources for authorising the unconstitutionality of
capital punishment in South Africa.
Van der Walt is particularly derisory about the Court’s treatment of
ubuntu in Makwanyane. Chaskalson P is criticised for his ‘lack of
jurisprudential rigour’ and lack of reference to African literature or
jurisprudence on ubuntu,
58
 Mandala and Mokgoro JJ for ‘thin and
jurisprudentially vague’ substantiations of ubuntu,
59
 Langa J for
deploying ‘commonplace’ and ‘trite’ understandings of ubuntu,
60
 and
Mohamed J is inelegantly derided for giving an ‘utopian rendition of
ubuntu [which] would have had John (imagine all the people) Lennon
scrambling for new verses.
61
 One senses a degree of contempt, if this is
not putting it too strongly, for a judiciary that has sought to include
indigenous values and concepts without a substantial account of these
notions from some ‘valid’ literature. Justice Sachs’ acknowledgement of
the fact that judges are limited to some extent by the submissions made
by Counsel in proceedings, and notwithstanding this, his attempt to
ground the treatment of ubuntu in a non-exhaustive literature and
indigenous cultural practices on punishment, is dismissed by Van der
Walt as ‘disingenuous’
62
, and only giving the ‘impression’ of grappling
with the principles of African law.
63
 It is not difficult to imagine why
barristers appearing before the Constitutional Court may not be
particularly well versed on ubuntu. How much exposure, under







apartheid, or indeed even now, do law students and practitioners have
to non-European principles, philosophies, or values? 
Van der Walt’s attack on the reasoning of the Judges in Makwanyane
is carried out in the name of ‘rigorous jurisprudence’: ‘a rigorous
jurisprudence must be dissatisfied with the feel-good flavour of a
jurisprudence that has done little more than add a local, indigenous and
communitarian touch to the Christian, Kantian or Millsian respect for the
individual that informs Western jurisprudence’.
64
 Why does the ‘local,
indigenous, and the communitarian’ hold such a ‘flickering light’ in the
face of the ‘Christian, Kantian and Millsian’ ground of the western legal
subject? And if Christianity in particular is to be so readily invoked, one
wonders what submissions were made to the court on that basis, or
indeed on the basis of Kant or Mill? Is it not a particular ‘culture’ –
perhaps even a particular civilisation – that is being reasserted here?
Universality, Gramsci taught us, is always a hegemonised particularity.
In a postcolonial context, where decolonising the legal system and the
minds of its lawyers, judges, and intellectuals is at stake, would it not
have been more apt to congratulate the court for offering a (African)
philosophical basis for rejecting the death penalty? This is particularly so
given the extent to which arguments in cases regarding the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty tend to rely so heavily on consequen-
tialist rather than principled arguments. But for the court to have been
congratulated, the commentator would have to grant ubuntu the status
of philosophy. An onto-epistemology for forgiveness, reconciliation, and
even for something as specific as outlawing the death penalty is available
in the ‘new’ South Africa. Judges of the Constitutional Court, and
constitutional drafters (in the context of the interim constitution) began
to recognise that. It remains for intellectuals to decolonise their minds.
According to Van der Walt, the vague ideas about ubuntu
apparently deployed by the court tell us nothing about the
constitutionality of capital punishment.
65
 A ‘rigorous jurisprudence’
would surely want to engage with specific norms inspired by ubuntu
and the profile of punishment in African culture ‘before reaching any
conclusions on the meaning of ubuntu for the question of the
constitutionality of capital punishment’.
66
 Despite such commanding
insight into what ‘rigorous jurisprudence’ in this context might entail,
Van der Walt has exempted his own survey from this standard.
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The several references on page 113 to ‘African culture’, or sayings in African





Virtually all of the assertions and characterisations about ubuntu in
his own account are drawn from the Makwanyane decision which he
impugns for a lack of rigour.
67
 Despite the insubstantial account of
ubuntu philosophy, the following dramatic conclusions are drawn:
having engaged at least somewhat with the communitarian substance of
the concept of ubuntu, would a rigorous jurisprudence not approach this
investigation with a nagging suspicion that individual life may actually be
less worthy of protection in traditional African cultures than it is in
Western cultures? Would this investigation not proceed in trepidation for
fear of what it might find, fear that it might find that African cultures
often or at least sometimes exacted a fine of a number of head of cattle
as punishment for murder, on the one hand, and capital punishment for
the theft of cattle, on the other?
68
For those familiar with the staggering excesses of European
imperial endeavours, in part at least inspired by the theological and
political philosophies of western cultures, there will be no such fear
or trepidation! For those familiar with how Christian anti-Semitism
and the European enlightenment matured into the holocaust of
European Jews there will be no such fear or trepidation! Another
difficulty with this statement is that a discussion of capital
punishment, on which there are multiple accounts in various cultural
and legal systems and discourses, is the setting for Van der Walt’s
discussion of ubuntu. The Court’s treatment of capital punishment in
Makwanyane ranges widely, including to the US and European
jurisdictions. The lesson to be drawn from the African examples could
have been read as the desire to restore balance and ‘equilibrium’ to
society rather than the interpretation that life was cheap in African
cultures, and that such would always be the case. 
Van der Walt draws his ‘nagging suspicion’ about (some) African
traditional practices of punishment from Justice Sachs’ account in
Makwanyane. He is not suggesting that the Courts or ‘post-apartheid’
jurisprudence should entirely steer clear of the concept of ubuntu.
69
But on the basis of the account of ubuntu in Makwanyane he is
prepared to give instructions on how South African jurisprudence
should approach the concept of ubuntu, and indeed reduces the
concept to the ‘feudal and hierarchical’:





continued use of ubuntu in South African jurisprudence would require
a good deal of critical inquiry and honest critical thinking to distil
from the feudal, hierarchical, and thus vertical trappings of this
concept a different understanding of constitutionality in terms … of
the radical equality that [Jean-Luc] Nancy contemplates when he
refers to the horizontality of mortals.
70
Ubuntu is thus reduced to a rather impoverished notion of
‘communitarianism’. Van der Walt asks whether such ubuntu sayings as
‘a person is a person through people’ (the Shona version being ‘I am
because we are; I exist because the community exists’), demonstrates
that being-more-than one, being singular plural in Nancy’s terms,
‘degenerates into a communal whole’.
71
 In other words, his question is
whether the concept of ubuntu is nothing more than the expression of a
feudal and hierarchical setting of social stasis where communal needs
supersede the individual. His is not an intervention in the name of any
individualism, but in the pursuit of the ‘horizontality’ of social relations
which he draws from the notion of ‘being singular plural’ – the ontology
of co-appearance of singular beings – set out by Jean-Luc Nancy. One
need not only be enamoured with the Kantian and enlightenment
injunction that ‘we should dare to know’ in order to take up the
challenge of a critical inquiry into ubuntu. It should necessarily follow
from the urgent need to decolonise South Africa. 
In what follows I will attempt to engage with some of the
interrogatories that Van der Walt has issued in relation to ubuntu. Ubuntu
cannot be reduced to a communitarian ethic where the individual is
subordinated to the ethical, political, and moral horizons of the
community. More comprehensive accounts of ubuntu are readily
available, but they receive no attention in Law and Sacrifice. In what
follows I will draw again on Ramose’s account with a view to addressing
some of the mis-characterisations of ubuntu in Van der Walt’s account.
It is not accurate to claim, for instance, that ubuntu is a ‘vertical’ or
‘hierarchical’ concept. The philosophy of ubuntu does contain a striving
towards ‘wholeness’ or togetherness, but there is no reason to present
this as an ‘absolute’, as predetermined hierarchical whole or feudal
stasis. Of course, it is pointless to suggest that African culture, like any
other, does not feature hierarchy, or to discuss whether this or that
‘culture’ values life more than another. These are spurious inquiries in
themselves and I shall not dwell further on these matters.
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It is clear from Ramose’s account of ubuntu that the ‘wholeness’
of society should not be read as stasis or fixity. If anything, what is
clear about the concept of be-ing in ubuntu, is that ‘Ubu-’ is ‘marked
by uncertainty’ because it is ‘by definition motion involving the
possibility of infinite unfoldment and concrete manifestation into a
multiplicity of forms and organisms’.
72
 ‘Ubu-’ expresses the notion of
‘be-ing in general’, the widest generality of be-ing.
73
 ‘Umu-’ shares
a similar ontology, but is more specific. ‘Umu-’, joined with ‘-ntu’,
umuntu, marks the emergence of homo loquens and in ‘common
parlance means the human be-ing: the marker of politics religion and
law’.
74
 The inquiry into being, experience, knowledge and truth is
conducted by umuntu – but this is ‘an ongoing process’, an ‘activity
rather than an act’.
75
 Hence ‘ubu-’ is regarded as ‘be-ing
becoming’.
76
 This is crucial to our inquiry. It implies a notion of be-
ing as incessant motion.
77
 Umu-ntu/ubu-ntu in incessant motion can
then be expressed with the emphasis on the ‘verbal’ rather than the
verb ‘–ntu’. Ubuntu is then a ‘verbal noun’ – that is to say, in
grammatical terms, it is a ‘gerund’ (‘a form of verb functioning as a
noun’ – in English ending in -ing and used with a verb – OED).
78
 This is
a disruption of the regular western opposition between being and
becoming. ‘Be-ing becoming’ places the emphasis on motion, and is
thus against the fragmentation of being.
79
 The association of ‘being’
with order and ‘becoming’ with chaos is broken by the ‘flow’ (the
Greek verb, rheo) of ‘be-ing becoming’. The general view is that the
‘apparent structure of language determines the sequence of
thought’.
80
 As language breaks the silence of be-ing, ‘be-ing
becoming’ must be understood in and through the ‘rheomode’
language.
81
 This has implications for how the legal subject is
conceptualised, and can be explained at that more concrete level.
The logic of ubu-ntu follows that of a rheomode language. A
rheomode language places emphasis on the gerund (the verb
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functioning as a noun – the ‘–ing’ in be-ing), and opposes the ‘subject-
verb-object’ linguistic structure.
82
 Of course this linguistic structure
which privileges the name/noun as the acting moving subject has
been undone by many philosophers, including by Jacques Derrida in
his work on the ‘trace’ which marks and exceeds the appearance of
all signification, as well as in his deconstruction of the metaphysics
of ‘presence’. These insights are incorporated by Ramose.
83
 The
‘subject-verb-object’ structure asserts an ontology where
subject/object are distinct entities and the verb acts as mediator. It
is in this way that what Ramose terms the ‘fragmentation of be-ing’
takes place. It is through this ontological structure that western legal
thought attributes rights and duties to the ‘nounized legal subject’.
84
Ramose’s account of law through ubuntu articulates a shift from the
‘noun’ to the ‘verbal noun’, the gerund.
85
 Though there is not the
space to pursue a comparison here, this task is comparable with
Derrida’s attempt to undo ipseity – the impossibility of the ‘self-
same’, the ‘I can’, or auto-nomy.
86
The whole-ness that the philosophy of ubuntu is supposed to
inspire is thus not the absolute of community-as-law or communi-
tarianism. Rather whole-ness through ubuntu is the recognition that
be-ing is not fragmented as the subject/noun ‘be!’ as it is in (some)
western Ontologies.
87
 Ubuntu philosophy undoes the abstract human
subject of western legal thought.
88
 It eschews the re-presentation of
the subject as the abstract representation of the ‘subject-verb-
object’ structure of language/law. It does so by de-centring the
nounal subject from the fragmentation subject/object. African law:
is law without a centre since the legal subject here is an active but
transient participant in the be-ing, that is, the musical flow of law …
ubuntu law is not only the ontology of the do-ing subject. It is
contemporaneously the epistemology of the dicern-ing subject
continuously harmonising the music of the universe. In this sense,
ubuntu philosophy of law is a dynamology. Law here is thus dynamic
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The subject is then not obliged to live ‘within the law’ as with the
western legal subject, but to ‘live the law’.
90
 The object of law
inspired by ubuntu is to maintain equilibrium.
91
Drucilla Cornell and Karin van Marle have commented on how
ubuntu might be regarded as an interactive ethic that stands behind
the law in the ‘new’ South Africa.
92
 On their account, ubuntu is not
only an account of being or existence. It is also an ‘ontic orientation
in which who and how we can be as human beings is always being
shaped in our interaction with each other’.
93
 They distinguish ubuntu
from communalism or communitarianism – terms that suggest the
privileging of community over the individual – arguing that what is at
stake in ubuntu’s ontic orientation is the ‘process of becoming a
person’, and how one is given a chance to become a person.
94
 This
accords with Ramose’s account of ubuntu as ‘be-ing becoming’.
Community is then not some static entity ‘outside’ the individual:
‘The community is only as it is continuously brought into being by
those who “make it up”’.
95
 Cornell and Van Marle explain how this
ontic orientation of ubuntu can be deployed so that freedom can be
understood as indivisible. With the Constitutional Court’s decision in
Makwanyane in mind, they explain how a society that allows the
death penalty institutionalises a form of a vengeance as the field in
which we must all operate. A conception of freedom drawn from
ubuntu ‘is not freedom from; it is freedom to be together in a way
that enhances everyone’s capability to transform themselves in their
society’.
96
 Given ubuntu is an ‘ontic orientation within an interactive
ethic, it is indeed a sliding signifier whose meaning in terms of a
definition of good and bad is always being re-evaluated in the context
of actual interactions, as these enhance the individual’s and
community’s powers’.
97
 While some might call this imprecise,
unpredictable, or a dangerous basis on which to curtail state violence
(such as the death penalty), Cornell and Van Marle argue that the
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Nancy Being singular plural (2001); Nancy The inoperative community (1991).
‘bloatedness of ubuntu’ is actually its strength.
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 One person’s
freedom may still be destroyed by the community. This will endure
as long as there are competing freedoms, and especially in the realm
of punishment. But ubuntu is an African principle of transcendence





The emancipatory purchase of the philosophy of ubuntu in the context
of decolonisation is considerable. Ubuntu has certainly shown its
potential, evidenced by its deployment in the interim Constitution and
the early decisions of the Constitutional Court, to help to restore some
equilibrium in a fractured society. But this is where the engagement with
ubuntu, and with Ramose’s writings must be undertaken critically.
Ramose claims that ‘authentic liberation’ must involve a restoration of
sovereignty, the restoration of title to land which was taken during the
unjust wars of colonialism (94-5). While I have attempted here to be
attentive to the philosophy of ubuntu as it has been articulated by
Ramose and others, I by no means accept the conclusions Ramose
reaches concerning the possibility of the recovery of a lost sovereignty.
The de-centring of a nounal conception of being, be-ing in a rheomode
language, also requires that the being of sovereignty be accorded the
same treatment as that of all be-ing. The problem of postcolonial
sovereignty is not specific to the Bantu speaking peoples of South Africa.
As I stressed at the outset, the sovereign disaster is universal. One of the
key constitutional dilemmas the world-over has been the challenge of
departing from a monistic and essentialist conception of sovereignty. In
a liberal legal order this is expressed through the tension between
legislative and constitutional supremacy. Ramose seeks onto-epistemo-
logical parity and political equality for what he terms the ‘indigenous
conquered peoples of South Africa’. He has elected, perhaps strategical-
ly, to articulate this in terms of a quest for sovereign parity. But both in
ubuntu and some western ontologies (such as those set out by Jean-Luc
Nancy), such a singular presence of sovereignty is impossible, and hence
a ‘lost sovereignty’ is unrecoverable.
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 The trace of the usurpation of old
sovereignties, and the inscription of new ones can certainly be
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memorialised and archived (in all senses of the latter term). But a pre-
colonial sovereignty, or sovereignties, must not be monumentalised.
101
The be-ing of sovereignty is itself an in-finite plurality. 
In more concrete terms this problem of recovering sovereignty has
been confronted by feminist and anti-capitalist thinkers like Andrea
Smith.
102
 Smith addresses the political dilemmas of according priority to
tackling violence against women as a mode of colonial genocide in
nation-states such as the United States. Native feminist activists have
confronted the issue of whether recovering pre-colonial sovereignty will
return a more pristine community where women are not violated and
denigrated in the way they are in colonial societies. The question has
been whether racial justice should be prioritised over gender justice –
the argument being that the latter would follow from the former. Smith
points out the falsity of these claims – and her arguments have a much
wider bearing on the question of postcolonial sovereignty. The attention
to sovereignty can often be at the expense of attending to the very real
violence that has been ‘internalised’ and is committed across boundaries
of coloniser and colonised, but also within colonised communities:
‘Unfortunately, we continue to perpetuate this colonial violence through
domestic/sexual violence, child abuse, and homophobia. No amount of
reparations will be successful if we do not address the oppressive
behaviours we have internalised’.
103
 Moreover, the violence of exclusion
arising out of any concept of the nation needs to be interrogated. Smith
questions whether self-determination for indigenous people needs to be
equated with nation-state sovereignty. She calls for the creation of other
forms of governance which do not conform to domination and control.
104
Postcolonial sovereignty is in-finite. It must be rendered finite in
order to inaugurate a new social and juridical order. But its reach is
also infinite – it cannot be fully departed from. There is no past
without its disastrous ‘future perfect’, no present without its anterior
trauma, and no future that is not already undone. The problem of
postcolonial politics today must be understood in terms of this in-
finite character of colonial sovereignty. We must also understand the
postcolonial problem of sovereignty as not only pertinent to the
erstwhile colonies, but also to the political dilemmas of a wider
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world. Contesting and re-inventing sovereignties needs to be much
more mindful of the problems of global justice. 
The following questions emerge out of the present study as needing
further attention. How will a suppressed onto-epistemology contend with
existing hegemonic orders? What is the relationship between particular
epistemes and the demand to universalise freedom and equality? How
can the logic of sacrifice be viewed differently? What mode of politics
would be better suited to acknowledging political antagonism without
surrendering to dubious accounts of the loss of political subjectivity? In
grappling with the competing epistemological approaches to the question
of being, plurality, and normativity, legal theorists, judges and lawyers
need to be attentive to how institutional structures and individual
juridical decisions are hegemonised particularities. Contending with this
hegemony must involve a politics that reflexively competes among a
variety of positions in an agonistic struggle in which there will be winners
and losers. Pretending otherwise is neither politically responsible nor
theoretically sound. 
